Compiled Simulation Data from NTSB Exhibit 22D. Orange box added by FIRO.

All NTSB crash sequence simulations in Addendum 22D fall outside the radar tolerances during a time when Flight 800 is proposed to climb sharply by federal investigators. The simulated steep climbs resulted from the simulated removal of the forward fuselage from the rest of the aircraft four seconds after the initiating event. No other damage is factored into the NTSB simulations--damage that could reduce and even negate the substantial gains in altitude shown. The law of conservation of energy dictates that Flight 800 did not climb as depicted in federal simulations.

In December of 1997, the National Transportation Safety Board held a public hearing on the Flight 800 tragedy. At this hearing, a simulation report (Exhibit 22C) was released that showed two "data fitting" crash scenarios that included Flight 800 climbing a maximum of 1,300 feet in altitude immediately following the initiating event. However, nearly two years later, Flight 800 Independent Researchers Organization (FIRO) challenged the validity of these simulations by a direct comparison with the main wreckage flight path, as tracked by NTSB radar experts.

Figure 1: East vs. time plot from NTSB Exhibit 13A and 22C. Radar trace of the main wreckage (circled and numbered data), statistical mean of radar trace (blue line), and NTSB simulations (green and black lines).

FIRO showed that the simulation data did not fit the radar data (Figure 1) and released this information at a nationally televised (C-span) press conference on August 27, 1999. Then, in an apparent response to this press conference, the NTSB in January 2000 released Exhibit 22D--a follow-up report to the original simulation exhibit. Exhibit 22D analyzed the radar data by conducting an error analysis and releasing new simulations.

This new NTSB exhibit shows that all NTSB simulations fall outside of the error bars of the East-West versus Time graphs, just as was stated to Congress by FIRO three months prior. But even though these new simulations do not match the radar data, this report continues to support simulations that show Flight 800 now climbing a maximum of 3,000 feet* after the initiating event.

*This is 1,700 feet higher than in the original NTSB report due to the fact that two of the three radar sites used to track the main wreckage were ignored in each individual Exhibit 22D simulation.

Exhibit 22D

The NTSB considered three types of simulations in exhibit 22D: fast; nominal; and slow. "Fast" meant that the drag force was minimized, while maximizing the upward pitching moment caused by an alleged downward rotation of the nose during its separation from the plane. "Slow" meant that the drag was maximized and the upward pitching moment minimized. "Nominal" simulations were likely an average of "Fast" and "Slow," but there is no explicit definition within exhibit 22D.

The NTSB conducted an error analysis on individual radar data points based upon uncertainties in the range and azimuth of each individual radar return. These uncertainties were represented in the form of "boxes" drawn around each relevant data point. Below, it will be shown that all Exhibit 22D simulations fall outside of these uncertainty boxes during proposed steep climbs. Strangely, the author of Exhibit 22D never acknowledges that all simulations are outside the uncertainty boxes, but does acknowledge that some are.

The author of exhibit 22D directs the reader's attention to "East vs. time" plots after detailing the first two simulations.

Slow Simulation: "As can be seen from the East vs. time plot in figure 6, the slow simulations for all the radars are outside the radar band for the event."

Nominal Simulation: "As can be seen from the East vs. time plot in figure 11, the nominal simulations for all radars are outside the radar tolerance in the region between approximately 755 and 770 [seconds]."

A logical inference can be made by the above quotes that the first two simulations (slow and nominal) are invalid due to being "outside the radar tolerances" for at least 15 seconds during the simulated steep climb.

Fast Simulation: Here, the author directs the reader's attention to a "North vs. East" plot (figure 15) and states,

"As shown in figure 15, the fast simulations flew very close to the radar points."

But what about the "East vs. time plot" for the fast simulation? This is the plot that apparently made each of the first two simulations invalid. Is the fast simulation's data within the "radar boxes?" From viewing the East vs. time plot for the fast simulation, it can be seen that all simulations are outside the radar tolerances for 15 seconds *during simulated climbs.

*The ISP simulation does cross through the radar tolerances briefly during this time, but is outside the radar tolerances and inconsistent with the other simulations for the majority of simulated flight.

Figure 2: Reproduction of figure 16 from NTSB Exhibit 22D. An orange, rectangular box has been added by FIRO to highlight deviations from radar tolerances.

The last simulation shown in Exhibit 22D is another "nominal" simulation, but only considers the JFK radar data and maximizes the time of nose departure (~5 seconds after the initiating event).

Nominal Simulation with late nose departure: The author does not comment on whether or not this simulation is consistent with any plot. But, the reader can see clearly that once again, this simulation is outside the radar tolerances for 15 seconds during simulated climbs.

Figure 3: Reproduction of figure 21 in NTSB Exhibit 22D. An orange, rectangular box has been added by FIRO to highlight deviations from radar tolerances.

The above inconsistencies between all NTSB simulations and the radar data occur at a time when Flight 800 is alleged to have climbed sharply. Figure 4 (below) is a composite of all exhibit 22D simulations for altitude vs. time and illustrates when the simulations fall outside of the radar tolerances.

Figure 4: Altitude vs. time for all exhibit 22D simulations. An orange, rectangular box has been added by FIRO to highlight deviations from radar tolerances.

From Figure 4 it is clear that no NTSB simulation remains within the radar tolerances during steep climbs. Indeed, all existing NTSB simulations exit the radar tolerances within 14 seconds of the initiating event, while Flight 800 is alleged to be climbing sharply by federal investigators.

Conclusion

The author of Exhibit 22D matched speculative simulations with individual radar datasets. Each simulation presented was outside the radar tolerances of each individual dataset during a time period when the plane was alleged to have climbed sharply. A natural conclusion from these results would be that the plane did not climb as steeply as alleged, or perhaps not at all. Unfortunately, the NTSB has not published a single simulation based on Flight 800 either descending or simply not climbing immediately following the initiating event.

The NTSB has acknowledged that the front section of the plane detached early in the crash sequence, and used this fact, and this fact alone, to manipulate flight characteristics during steered simulations. No mention is made of other types of damage found in the wreckage that could also affect the flight path in either simulation exhibit. Such unknowns should be acknowledged and considered by the author of the two simulation exhibits. Then, by justifiably considering the possibility that Flight 800 did not climb sharply after exploding violently, a resultant simulation may fit the radar data and therefore accurately describe the main wreckage flight path.

Implications

Since all NTSB simulations--which are based upon sharp climbs of the main wreckage--do not fit the radar data, it is natural to hypothesize that Flight 800 may not have climbed as sharply as depicted in federal simulations or perhaps not at all. To help confirm this hypothesis, physical laws such as the conservation of energy and momentum may be considered. These laws are based on the premise that energy and momentum do not originate from "thin air," but can always be traced back to some identifiable source.

The exchange of airspeed for altitude, known as the "zoom-climb," is a good example of the conservation of energy. The energy of a moving airframe can be exchanged for a gain in altitude, but only for a price: that airspeed is reduced. The steeper the climb, the faster a reduction in airspeed. The radar data shows Flight 800 traveling faster than all NTSB simulations during proposed zoom-climbs. Thus, the aircraft could not have climbed as steeply as alleged, since the necessary loss in ground speed (to account for the simulated climbs) is not shown in the radar data.

As discussed above, the official crash scenario was based solely upon the loss of the front section of the plane. Other damage to the wings, documented to have occurred early in the crash sequence, was not factored into any federal simulation, nor was the possibility of individual engine failure considered. These possibilities allow for countless other crash scenarios to be considered, including an early and rapid descent, which would fit the radar data better. Indeed, the law of conservation of energy dictates that one of these other scenarios is more likely.

NTSB Exhibit 13A

NTSB Exhibit 22C

Evidence the Main Wreckage Didn't Climb

For a Better Understanding of Simulation Data

FIRO Review of Exhibit 22D

Eyewitness Evidence

Altitude Adjustments